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Positive Negatives - or the subtle arts of compromise 
 
 
 
 
Compromise: Middle English, mutual promise to abide by an arbiter's 
decision, from Anglo-French compromisse, from Latin compromissum, 
from neuter of compromissus, past participle of compromittere to 
promise mutually, from com- + promittere to promise… First Known 
Use: 15th century 
 
intransitive verb 
1 a : to come to agreement by mutual concession  
b : to find or follow a way between extremes  
 
 
1400–50; late Middle English < Anglo-French compromisse, Middle 
French compromis < Latin comprōmissum joint agreement < 
comprōmittere to enter into an agreementi  
 
How slippery a term ‘collaboration’ is. Definitions aplenty tend to return to the 
notion of ‘working together’ (or ‘co-working’), and on this sort of basis we should 
be able to conclude that in all performance-making collaborations are vital 
because performance tends to involve the input of a wide range of practitioners, 
working together.  Amongst these practitioners we can list stage, sound and 
lighting designers, stage manager and many others who work alongside both 
performers and – in general terms – a lead decision-maker. Does this model fit 
widespread understandings of the meaning of the terms collaboration or 
‘Collaborative Theatre’ii?  The lead decision-maker might be the stage director 
or choreographer, familiar to many performance-making traditions, or might 
equally be one key member of a performance collective – as is the case of the 
long-established and internationally-renowned UK company Forced 
Entertainment and key decision-maker Tim Etchells, and, in theory at least, the 
Théâtre du Soleil, Paris, and the central decision-making role of Ariane 
Mnouchkine.  
However, few of the chapters included in this collection seem to be concerned 
with collaborations viewed from this default perspective.  Instead, collaborative 
performance-making in many of these chapters seems to assume the status of 
a particular genre or mode of performance-making, that brings with it, 
2 
 
inseparable from it, its own celebrated histories; and uses of the term, in certain 
circles at least, seem o carry with them a number of abstractions – a certain 
aura, a particular ethos, a set of popular discourses, and even a warming sense 
of commitment. Central amongst those circles of use is Performing Arts or 
Performance Studies in the British university, where collaborative making in an 
undergraduate or postgraduate module might seem to achieve a useful degree 
of empirical fit with popular discourses concerned with political action and 
agency. In the undergraduate and postgraduate Performance Studies module 
– in my experience – collaborators set out, curiously enough, from the premise 
of equality of potential: that is, each student is understood at the outset to have 
as much to offer the project as each other - however much it turns out to be the 
case, eventually, that those with skill, experience and persuasive personalities 
take the lead in decision-making. 
 
Amongst these positivities, however, I want to speak the word ‘collaboration’ 
again in order to sound a contrary note.  Although many colleagues in the 
university might argue, and indeed some do argue in these pages, that there 
are no failures in collaborative performance-making in the university context – 
since all such practices offer participants a learning experience – I am more 
concerned, in this chapter, with large or little failures in collaborative working 
practices that take place in the expert or professional performance-making 
sphere. I am interested, in this case, in both collaborative practices between 
expert practitioners, and in how things work in the performance collective, 
which seems to me equally to involve the ‘working together’ with which I began, 
but to do so with fewer or different claims to parity between diverse 
practitioners.  
I am arguing here that failure in the collaborative process in expert or 
professional performance-making is likely to put both or all practitioners 
involved at professional risk, and this is particularly but not exclusively so, 
where public funding and public reputation are involved. Professional co-
working, in such circumstances, is likely to set out from a sense of artistic 
affinity, and professional falling out, as a consequence, tends to be particularly 
bitter, even if public failure is often avoided – because it must be – by one or 
the other participant stepping in to reassert her or his (‘signature’) control. In 
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even the best of cases, however, collaborations in expert performance-making 
tend to proceed through, and to end in compromise. By compromise, here, I 
understand ‘to come to [a professional creative] agreement by mutual 
concession’. 
 
The issue of little or larger failures in expert or professional performance-
making, and the matter of compromises, similarly minor or major, brings not 
only reputation but affect to the fore in the collaborative equation - where, in 
fact, it has always been, even if reference to its operations has, until relatively 
recently, been largely omitted from the dominant discourses of theoretical 
writing in Performance Studies. Practitioner affect in the making processes is 
undoubtedly hard for most researchers –let alone practitioners themselves - to 
capture, and harder still to write about, yet practitioner affect – sensing or 
feeling something – is likely to be key to her or his experience in the makingiii.  
I have already used the words ‘at risk’ and ‘bitter’, above, suggesting, as I do 
so, that more is at stake, in collaborative practice between established 
practitioners, than the performance outcome. A practitioner’s name, and her 
signature (practices) are relatively fragile, as far as cultural capital is 
concerned, but so too are her or his feelings (professional as well as 
personal). In the always fraught world of arts funding, reputation tends to be a 
key token of exchange, hard won and easily lost. A professional 
choreographer working ‘collaboratively’ with a major theatre director may find 
that her or his input is subsumed under the signature of that director, late in 
the decision-making process, when the project is about to reach its audience.  
 
In such circumstances might the choreographer’s input not be, properly 
speaking, compromised, or unable to function optimally?  The highly reputed 
signature practitioner’s name so easily takes the place allotted to it by those 
who fund, write about and market professional performance in the wider arts 
communities. Hence the work will always be that of Ariane Mnouchkine, 
Robert Wilson or Tim Etchells, regardless of the importance of the input from 
choreographer, dancer, or expert performer (for example, Catherine Schaub, 
Lucinda Childs and Cathy Naden, amongst others). Plainly other artists 
understand the importance of the latters’ collaborative input – as they do 
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themselves – yet it would be foolish, on that basis, to make any claim as to 
parity of esteem for their input with the ‘signature’ practices and effects of the 
three theatre directors. Is the input of these other expert practitioners 
compromised, or ‘unable to function optimally’, as a consequence?   
If my argument is valid here, then not simply do collaborations proceed through 
and end in compromise – even in the very best of cases – but they do so 
precisely because an established artist working collaboratively does so, 
explicitly or not, in order to open her work to difference, to give way to 
difference, to the end (or at least to the possibility) of what Brian Massumi has 
called ‘qualitative transformation’iv: in this case, what is entailed is a 
transformation in the practitioner’s experience of self under the gaze of the 
(respected) other.  That other looks back – and this is vital – at the established 
artist, and ‘sees her’, and her or himself, differently. The relationship, as I have 
already indicated, is affectively charged, as well as professional. She sees the 
other seeing her, and it is on the basis of shared artistic affinity, as well as 
professional respect, that professional or expert collaborative practices engage 
with and work through this affective charge 
 
This complex scenario may perhaps signal why the failure of a collaborative 
undertaking is likely either to be so damaging, or to force one practitioner to 
assume a fragile control in difficult circumstances. It is not necessary to have 
read a great deal of the work of French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacanv, to 
recognize that the gaze of the (respected) other exposes the self, and is likely 
to interrogate her as well as reassure her. On these sorts of bases, I propose 
to identify such collaborative undertakings as experimental in process (if not 
necessarily in outcome); as such they are likely to be characterized by a 
particular intensity of experience, as each practitioner involved attempts to 
negotiate with her or his other – and, effectively, with her or his self – with a 
deadline in view and a reputation at stake. What follows, in time, is the further 
development of expertise.  
 
The scenario I have outlined above, may however also hint at the reasons for 
undertaking these sorts of highly charged collaborative experiments: the expert 
practitioner learns through the experience of expert practice, whether it is 
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judged by others to be successful or less successful.  Her expertise is not 
simply developed or elaborated ‘through practice’vi, but rather more importantly 
through the experience of practices (in the plural). She learns – and this is key 
–through difference, and she learns, as I suggest below, retrospectively, when 
some of the intensity of the collaborative or collective experience has lessened. 
Collaborative practices potentially enhance by energizing other, more 
established single-practitioner modes of practice, by bringing expert otherness 
into the making processes: on these bases the quality of the experience is likely 
to be intense, and that intensity may well not be lived as entirely positive in the 
short-term. Time, time present and time passing, in other words, is key to the 
development of experience and expertise. 
 
I have suggested that expert collaborations tend to be experimental in process; 
that they are likely to involve a certain intensity of experience, and that it is this 
sort of intensity of experience, however difficult at the time, that is likely to 
develop expertise in a practitioner who might be more accustomed to make 
work alone (or in her or his own name). Although there has been much written 
about experimentation in performance in the 20thC, neither ‘experience’ nor 
‘expertise’, for different reasons, has been widely theorized in the major 
discourses of Performance Studies in the university, as distinct, undoubtedly, 
from the disciplinary fields of Psychology, Sociology or Education, or the more 
recently emerged and interdisciplinary ‘practice theory’vii have suggested that 
all expert or professional collaborations are experimental in process – for the 
practitioners involved (this has little to do with what has been called 
‘experimental theatre’ in the 20thC), and it is their contribution to expert 
practitioners in terms of experience that is vital.   
 
Certainly such collaborations bring uncertainty into the equation, starting from 
the fact of artistic affinity: where expertise has been bound up with the ability to 
exercise a certain control upon process and outcome, collaborations require, 
as I indicate above, a certain agreement to loosen that control, and to admit 
difference into play. By compromise, in this case, I refer to a joint agreement 
and ‘mutual concession’ between practitioners, each of whom, in the event of 
collaboration, is likely to contribute differently to an end or ends unlikely to be 
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discernible in advance of the fact of working together. Surely this is the 
challenge of such an undertaking? Mutual concession seems to me to suppose 
a degree of letting go, indeed of loss, in both or all participants, in order to gain 
something more and other, but it also seems to me that there are few 
guarantees, in such a framework, that the collaborating practitioners will 
experience loss to the same degree and/or extent.   
 
The notion of a ‘promise to abide by an arbiter’s decision’ (above) is a delicate 
one, in the collaborative framework or the framework of collective creation, but 
it is one that I return to below with reference to both the (emergent) decisive 
role of one practitioner within the collaborative undertaking, and the role in 
creative invention played by disciplinary codes. Rather than a belief in a 
seemingly non-hierarchical mode of creative decision-making – which is 
undoubtedly useful in the undergraduate context where group devising is a 
widely adopted model of pedagogy – I have already identified affinity between 
artists, who are likely to work, in many instances of performance-making, in 
quite different artistic disciplines, as a basis for and means to working 
collaboratively. Artistic affinity is a curiously under-discussed notion, as far as 
academic writing about performance is concerned, yet it is a vital factor within 
the arts.   
 
affinity c.1300, "relation by marriage" (as opposed to consanguinity), from 
O.Fr. lit. "bordering on," from ad- "to" (see ad-) + finis "a b   order, an end" 
(see finish). Used figuratively since c.1600 of structural relationships in 
chemistry, philology, etc. Meaning "natural attraction”viii 
 
Affinity can operate productively in the professional or expert sphere without 
the need for a pre-existing personal affinity. Mutual respect for the other’s work, 
similarly under-theorized in academic writingix, is likely to be a vital factor in 
expert collaborations. Working together, in the case of what I have called 
‘signature practitioners’ – publicly recognized, named practitioners whose work 
and name are one – is particularly challenging because of the degree of ‘mutual 
concession’ to be negotiated.   
 
7 
 
Where expert performance-makers choose to collaborate, or to create 
collectively, in other words, they do so on the basis of some kind of perception 
of professional or expert affinity and respect, but in the light of an equally-
strong perception of difference or heterogeneity viewed as likely to be 
productive. Such perceptions are often rapidly made, and there does tend to 
be a sense of recognition involved, likely to appear to be holistic rather than 
analytical, although it is also my sense that analysis of potential is likely 
already to have occurred elsewhere – hence Shobana Jeyasingh’s decision to 
collaborate with Michael Nyman, in making dance works that will bear her 
signature as choreographerx, is likely to have been informed by a pre-existing 
and very complex exercise, by Jeyasingh, of judgement of his compositions. 
 
In such an instance, besides, Jeyasingh is likely to commission Nyman’s 
collaboration, with very clear implications as regard to signature and/or 
‘ownership’ of what is made. I am supposing that from the outset, however, 
Jeyasinghcognizes a possibility of working productively with the composer, 
without knowing perhaps at that point in time how the composer himself works 
– his working in isolation, for example, whereas she works with others; the 
rhythm of his working, for example, in contrast with her own dance rehearsals 
with a group of highly-skilled dancers, develops, over what is sometimes an 
extended period of time. What this suggests, succinctly enough, is making-
processes significantly at odds with each other within a professional 
collaboration: if they ‘co-labour’, it is largely at a safe distance from each 
other. What seems to me to be important to note about this sort of 
collaboration is that it brings together disciplinary difference – at least two 
complex knowledge sets, with their attendant and relative hierarchies – as 
well as different ways of seeing, knowing and working – and that it is likely 
that each participant will at certain key moments struggle to keep a sense that 
these two knowledge sets and ways of working, as well as the aesthetic 
preferences of each, will at some point – because they are both professionals 
– achieve a sense, however fragile and momentary, of empirical fit, the one 
with the other to the advantage of both.   
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My own sense nonetheless is that collaboration triggers a stronger rather than 
weaker sense of ownership in each participant, a stronger sense of 
disciplinary mastery, a stronger rather than a weaker sense of the rightness of 
a way of working.  It can also trigger, as far as I have been able to discern, 
frustration, anger, anxiety, anticipation, despair, irritation, all of which seem to 
me to be normally a part of this sort of collaboration, and all of which seem to 
me to be ‘containable’, in the experience of it, only on the basis of a pre-
existing and expert exercise of judgement as to the credibility of the other 
professional artist involved. 
 
I want to direct your attention now to one particular instance of the history of 
collaborative or collective performance-making, as some of us experienced it 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and to draw on it in order to come back to one or two 
of the issues I have already identified. Rather than a collaborative company, 
the Théâtre du Soleil identified itself in terms of a ‘sociéte coopérative 
ouvrière de production’ – a cooperative workers’ production group or 
corporation or collective. I have written ‘so-called’ because of a curiosity of 
English language reporting practised by the esteemed David Williams, whose 
Théâtre du Soleil Sourcebook, noted above, is entitled Collaborative Theatre, 
even though the term ‘collaboration’ figures twice only in his book’s Index. The 
term preferred throughout by the practitioners themselves was and is 
‘collective’. This raises again the notion of the impact on the exercise of 
judgement of heterogeneous models of intelligibility. One of the two 
references to the collaborative, in William’s book of that name, dates from 
1975, when Mnouchkine declared that  
 
Remember that the [theatre] director has already achieved the greatest 
degree of power he has ever had in history.  And our aim is to move 
beyond that situation by creating a form of theatre where it will be 
possible for everyone to collaborate without there being directors, 
technicians, and so on, in the old sense.xi  
 
Ironically, perhaps, Mnouchkine was already, in her own words in 1971, a 
director within the Théâtre du Soleil as collective, but her understanding of her 
role contrasts with her knowledge of the metteur en scène in the French 
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tradition, that she qualified as ‘in the old sense’.  In 1971 – that is three years 
after May 1968 – the theatre director to whom Mnouchkine alluded advisedly 
as ‘he’, had constructed himself as ‘l’auteur de la scène’(‘the author of the 
stage’) whereas David William’s way of seeing theatre directors, in 1999 from 
the UK, was not informed by the lived experience of that French peculiarity. 
William’s genuine concern with collaborative practices, which I would argue 
he has retrospectively projected onto the Théâtre du Soleil’s work for an 
English-language audience, needs to be positioned in the context of the 
British university’s recourse, from the 1980s onwards, to group-devised 
performance-making as a highly economical way of undergraduate and 
postgraduate teaching and assessment, following upon the growth of 
performance as a very popular discipline in the university. 
 
The French did have good reason in the 1960s and 1970s not to like the term 
‘collaboration’, because of the still-ongoing accusation that many French had 
collaborated with occupying Germans during WII.  For me, however, the term 
‘collective’ is interestingly different in implication from ‘collaboration’. It can 
suppose that parts of the making might occur separately, or elsewhere, and 
be brought together, possibly with catalytic impact on the rest, possibly not – 
especially if the staging is identified as ‘carnivalesque’ – without nonetheless 
emerging from a collaborative ‘working together’. What Williams has called 
collaborative, in the early significant work of the Théâtre du Soleil, was, in the 
making, cooperative and collective, as far as I have been able to discern, in 
that 1789, at least, grew out of already-established practices of the group 
mastered for Les Clowns: these consisted of the perfecting of ‘each person’s 
individual creation’, but in 1789 the co-creation was informed by each 
participant’s shared knowledge of French myth – for example, the French 
revolution and its frustrated aspiration to liberty, equality and fraternity. 
(Mnouchkine refused in interview in 1970xii with Emile Copfermann to call 
preparation for Les Clowns ‘collective creation’, precisely because of its 
emphasis on collecting together individually-created and evaluated 
performance units.)   
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Preparatory work for 1789 was explicitly ‘group work’, but it made no claims, 
as far as I could see, to a dissolve of hierarchies in the exercise of judgement 
in creative decision-making.  Mnouchkine, tellingly, did not perform in the work 
that has progressively associated itself with her signature, and as tellingly, 
when we see some of the images from the makingxiii in the case of her 
Tartuffe (1995), the very fact that everyone else in the shots is in costume, 
while she is not, signals this division and this decision-making hierarchy: she 
is, as I have suggested above, in the rehearsal room and in this scene at 
least, the signature practitioner, the ‘arbiter’ to whom I refer, above, with 
whose decision-making all others present agree (com- + promittere – to 
promise mutually) to abide.  Is this ‘collaborative performance-making’?  
 
Certainly it is a ‘working together’, and collectively, and it assumes, I would 
argue, as expert or professional collaborations in the arts communities tend 
to, that final creative decisions are likely to be taken by the (possibly 
emergent) decision-maker within that group – from which comes the notion 
that something is com-promised, by the collective, to the end of the work’s 
emerging in a timely manner.  That decision-maker, in a collective, may well 
not be the same single individual in each instance, since the work of the 
collective makes different demands in different times and places, but what 
seems to me to be clear is that detailed decision-making, before the work is 
made public, cannot be practised by the collective. The weight of judgement is 
openly assumed by a spokesperson/signature-marker, who may well be taken 
to represent the group of practitioners, but cannot usually represent the 
individual choices of all present. Whence compromise, that most delicate 
art.xiv  
 
In the case of the work of the Théâtre du Soleil there was clear evidence from 
its establishment in the 1960s of a political persuasion and that sense of 
commitment referred to above, coupled with an open distaste for certain 
established institutions, but I can find no evidence of a collaborative 
(‘equalising’) ethos as others might identify it. The choice of carnival was 
explicit and principled: they chose to operate to multiple viewpoints, dispersed 
in the spaces and times of performance; yet even in the photographic 
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evidence, there are moments of sharp performance delineation, of what I 
would characterise as an ‘older’ judgement of a theatricality that works, that 
one might argue is necessitated precisely because of the performance-
making expertise of each member of the collective, plus the aspiration, of 
each, to the multiple, to difference and dispersal within the one. Yet even in 
the 1960s, Mnouchkine’s role as director within the collective is clear and 
acknowledged. I noted, above, that one understanding of ‘compromise’ from 
the Middle English, the notion of a ‘mutual promise to abide by an arbiter's 
decision’, might nonetheless refer less to a person, as arbiter, than to the 
discipline, to theatrical codes and conventions themselves. In the work of 
Théâtre du Soleil, I would argue that it is her understanding of theatricality 
itself that drives Mnouchkine’s interventions. In the instance of Théâtre du 
Soleil, it is plainly also a theatricality that bears her signature, and it draws 
performers from around the world who want to work with her theatre 
collective. The compromise to which all eventually bend in the name of a 
particularly dazzling notion of theatricality - in the case of difficult rehearsal 
work for Tartuffe, to which we turn below - can be misunderstood as 
something that Mnouchkine imposes, leaving the performer’s own invention 
compromised.   
 In the collective’s preparations for Molière’s Tartuffe, a French cultural 
classic, the director’s aesthetic signature remained absolutely clear and – I 
would argue - unrepentant. It is consistently Mnouchkine’s signature – it can 
be identified in what I call her signature practices, which tend to work on every 
performance detail contributed/mediated by a performer arrived at within the 
work of the collective, that determines the detail as well as the larger lines of 
the performance aesthetic (and how the work is likely to be interpreted), and 
reinforces my hypothesis that this is an aesthetic/political practice that has 
developed consistently over thirty years, taking long-established members of 
the collective with it. In rehearsals for Tartuffe, as we see in the film Au Soleil 
mȇme la nuit, by ’Éric Darmon et Catherine Vilpouxxv my hypothesis is that 
the intensity of individual experience for one particular member of the 
collective, developed painfully over time within the event of creative 
performance-making, demonstrably involves a powerful experience of the self 
as other.  According to Milet’s interpretation of Heidegger, to which I return 
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below, that experience, importantly, is likely to be grasped, retrospectively, as 
transformative, however painful it is in the throes of the intense experience 
itself. 
 
In Au Soleil mȇme la nuit, a filmed account of the preparations for the 
production of Tartuffexvi, what we can see, in one particular segment, is an 
exercise of judgement that is individually voiced but collectively performed; it 
seems to be visited upon a single male actor by the collective, of which he is a 
privileged member. I would argue that his experience is overtly transformative, 
in the immediate circumstances, for that performer in terms of his ability to 
engage with the work of the group as a whole – indeed the production itself 
depended upon that development. In the longer term, it is likely that what was 
at stake was the development of his own expertise and artistry, and his ability 
to work productively with the other. What is staged in this extract from the film 
is a clash between the exercise of judgement of the director and the collective 
and the judgement of one performer, cast in one of the key performance roles 
(Valère) on the basis of his performance experience and growing expertise. In 
this short clip we see Mnouchkine in a state of what I take to be some 
distressxvii, before the assembled collective, because of rehearsal delays 
caused by the apparent inability of the actor concerned to work collectively 
(‘tout est pour l’autre’ – everything is done for the other, rather than 
individually, on the basis of his reflections of the night before.  The film offers 
a privileged insight firstly into the drama of the development of expertise in the 
performer-to-collective relationship, and secondly into what some of the few 
twentieth century writers on experience have called the ‘technicity of 
experience’xviii  
 
The notion of the technicity of experience derives from a particular 
understanding of the self that supposes that the self is both plastic rather than 
fixed, and that it is performed by each of us.  It follows that theatrical 
performance, drawing on the self of the actor in that context, might be 
grasped as a set of techniques that serve, symptomaticallyxix, to seem to 
expose that self either in the name of character or in the name of the 
performer concerned.  In ‘Experience as Technique of the Self’ Jean-Philippe 
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Milet argues ‘that the very heterogeneity of experience is to be found in its 
technical dimension; that is, that there can be no experience without 
transformation, above all, without transformation of the self, and that there can 
be no transformation without technics’xx. The techniques of the self tend to be 
sharply exposed in performance-making contexts, not least where a performer 
– as in the case of Tartuffe – is cast to play a pre-established dramatic 
character. The technicity of characterization, in performance involves the 
actor’s explicit access to and choices made from sets of physical symptoms, 
identifiable as such, that the expert performer her or himself can thematize: 
that is, he or she is able to work explicitly with a set of physical options, trying 
them out, testing and discussing, with those involved, what works and what 
works less well, and why.  These physical choices, plainly, can equally be 
understood as symptoms of or pointers to notions of the interiority of self (of 
dramatic character, as well as the actor’s selfxxi). The work of the collective 
that is Théâtre du Soleil is highly technical, explicitly choreographed, and 
Tartuffe emerged in the context of what in the UK was called – curiously 
enough – ‘physical theatre’, highly choreographed and physically demanding, 
where performer choices demonstrate considerable physical plasticity and 
control.  Actors working in the so-called ‘physical theatre’ are likely to be clear 
as to the sort of systems of options available, as well as their anticipated 
effect and affective potential.   
 
In my experience over the years, some viewers of this particular clip tend to 
see the individuals involved – as though these were individuals and 
personalities experiencing difficulties – rather than the productive work-based 
clash between different ways of making performance, where that 
performance, finally, will be identifiable in terms of the signature of a master 
performance-maker and the collective within which she works.  The 
individualisation of players in the collective tends to distract the onlooker from 
what are both heterogeneous work practices, for the individuals concerned, 
and collective practices specific to the company concerned. Working 
technically for the other (‘tout est pour l’autre’) in terms of Mnouchkine’s 
expertise, is a matter, in the instance cited and in the dramatic context 
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concerned, of minutely detailed gestuality and movement, dependent always 
on responses to tiny triggers emitted by the other performer. 
 
Many of us speak about qualitative transformation in performance-making, but 
we tend to be reticent as to the practices themselves that are capable of 
bringing creative transformation about, as a stage in the acquisition of 
expertise. Plainly a key difficulty for writers is that transformation in 
performance-making expertise can only be practised in a relational framework 
– that is, in the active presence of an other, who brings difference, as I point 
out above, into the equation. Within that relational framework, as the video 
clip makes fully clear, the actor concerned appears to be unable to grasp the 
need to work technically, in the first instance, with the other, that is, in live 
interaction with the finely articulated performance techniques of the long-
established company member (Juliana Carneiro da Cunha, seen below, 
standing) that seem to be alien to him.  The approach of Martial Jacques 
(seen below in rehearsal, fig.2) was intellectualizing, and he argued that he 
worked out what to do in the course of thinking it through the previous 
evening.   
 
Fig 1 Juliana Carneiro da Cunha 
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Fig 2 Martial Jacques 
Milet paraphrases from Heidegger’s writing on technicity, arguing that 
transformation of the self is arrived at retrospectively through a ‘becoming 
other’ of the selfxxii. When we transpose Milet’s heideggerian observations to 
this example of a quasi-public event presented to the gaze of the largely 
sympathetic other (the theatre collective assembled as audience – see figs 3 
and 4), hat needs to be understood is that the theatre worker concerned must 
endure that experience.  In Milet’s terms, he receives it as it strikes him, and 
he submits to it, with some very evident difficulty, not because the director in 
the collective imposes it upon him – this is to give way to myths of the 
tyrannical director -  but because the collective judgement is engaged, and 
because he has committed to that collective. Is his own inventive work 
compromised, or ‘unable to function optimally’, as we saw above?   
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Fig 3 Cast members of the collective serving as audience 
 
 
Fig 4 Members of the collective serving as audience at rehearsals 
 
I prefer to argue, instead, that what can eventually be seen in this clip is one 
aspect of the evidently painful experience that will lead, progressively, to a 
qualitative transformation, following intensive interactive and detailed work 
with the highly expert, long-time member of the collective.  He will become 
other to his (former sense of) self and therefore differently himself, through 
close confrontation with difference. We might argue the same, in the case of 
Mnouchkine, who – and this is rare enough – is later interviewed, alone in the 
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shot, on the difficulties that beset her here, and the actions she felt obliged to 
take.  It is plainly never too late, in the case of a major creative practitioner, to 
undergo a challenge to and a readjustment of the self.  
 
 
Fig 5 Ariane Mnouchkine addresses the question of rehearsal delays 
and her intervention 
 
‘Constitutive of identity’, Milet adds, ‘this alteration is not [immediately] 
absorbed within identity’, as we might expect of a short-term learning 
experience. Instead, alteration, experienced in – for example - productive 
collaborations, ‘opens [the identity of the self] up in a double sense’. Alterity or 
difference, in these instances, ‘both articulates and directs [identity], and [it] 
divides and splits it.  As I suggested above, this is precisely, to my mind, why 
expert practitioners agree and – in some cases - go on agreeing to 
collaborate. 
 
Thus any significant development in expertise and hence in practitioner 
identity as a working member of Théâtre du Soleil ‘is attained… as [an] event, 
[a] singularity’, and ‘it is always [acquired] retrospectively’. Collective creation, 
and/or collaboration, in this sense – and I realize that this view may not be 
popular – can do something of a violence to the self who commits (‘com-
promisse’; ‘comprōmittere’; ‘to find or follow a way between extremes’) to it: 
the expert practitioner, open to develop through qualitative transformation and 
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keen to work collaboratively, agrees in advance to this, endures it, before 
grasping its significance retrospectively.  
 
Now, transformative experience of the self, within the collective (or social group, 
or group of collaborators) might well – curiously enough – be seen as 
straightforwardly positive and quickly perceived by the performer concerned. 
Curiously, because an individual’s sense of self, ways of thinking, seeing, 
saying and doing, attitude and sense of the possible, tend, as far as I have been 
able to discern, to be impressed gradually over time, internalized, as well as 
externalized in actions taken, and many of us tend, as far as I can tell, to 
suppose that our own ‘sense of self’- entailing techniques of the self, modes of 
action in the everyday, that we consistently practise - is more or less stabilized 
and embedded. The ways we understand self in the everyday could be argued 
to constitute a major model of intelligibility, a way of understanding self and 
world that actually also contributes to both self and world. In this sort of 
understanding, a ‘learning experience’ might seem to be readily assumed, a 
positivity, that is effectively added to that already stabilized, carefully 
constituted self. The self expands. Yet the sort of qualitative transformation I 
have identified here, that is hard won, likely to disrupt and even to rupture the 
established sense of self and others, is likely, in Milet’s reading of Heidegger, 
to be perceived retrospectively. It is likely to be experienced, in the acutely 
intense events of collective making that we see in Au Soleil mȇme la nuit, as 
publicly wounding; yet I am arguing that it is precisely through this intense 
engagement with the other that the practitioner acquires some of the 
ingredients of an expertise that he or she does not necessarily recognise at the 
time. In performance-making, as it develops in the individual practitioner, 
through one or another instance of collaboration, it is experienced at best, in 
the event of it, as experimentation – ‘gained by repeated trials’, ‘tested’, ‘felt 
and undergone’xxiii. 
 
 
A withdrawal from a collaboration which ‘is not working’, at any point in the 
proceedings, might entail, for one or more party to the project in hand, ‘an 
endangering of reputation’, an ‘exposure to danger or suspicion’, both of which 
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are likely to have ongoing implications for the way each performance-maker 
involved views her or his own situation. One tends in the first instance to say 
‘That woman/man/individual is impossible!’, rather than, quietly to oneself, ‘Am 
I impossible?’. Such an exposure or endangering rankles, and goes on rankling, 
and my suggestion in this chapter is that one of the reasons for elation, when a 
collaboration finally ‘works’, is precisely because of a sense of relief coupled 
with a sense of expansion: expert collaborations tend to work, for one and 
another practitioner, by fracturing the established sense of self, to admit an 
otherness that challenges, for those artists for whom a challenge is desired. 
The elation seems to me to be relatively short-lived, and it is retrospectively, at 
some length, that the collaborator grasps the changes to the self that constitute 
an acquiring of expertise. 
 
I have suggested, above, that working together (or collaboration), even 
between expert or professional practitioners, tends, where those practitioners 
operate within a similar discipline – such as theatre-making and performance – 
to be characterized by differences in skill, experience and potential, 
necessitating ongoing negotiation and what might be merely an interim arrival 
at compromise. Performer expertise is both a curious phenomenon and an 
undertheorized field in the UK context. Training institutions differ in approach 
and the working individual tends to acquire expertise progressively through the 
shared experience of expert practices. For the less skilled with less experience 
of ‘working together’, whether in a formal collaboration or in collective 
performance-making, a ‘successful outcome’ will almost certainly constitute a 
training through practice, an elaboration of her or his own potential, yet I have 
also argued above that that experience of enhancement is likely to be painful 
in the event, if it is to be transformative after it. I am interested in how we might 
theorize that kind of learning through experience which is both bruising and 
potentially transformative of the self of the practitioner.   
 
Does the dominant engagement of the one mean that her other is necessarily 
dominated, within collective or collaborative practices? I am supposing that the 
matter is less straightforward than such an oppositional model would suggest, 
and that ‘the same’ complex, collective or collaborative undertaking is likely to 
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be differently experienced by each practitioner, both at the time and after it. 
What ensues is likely to be experienced as ‘not [wholly] of our own making’. To 
undergo it would ‘mean [in part to...] submit to it’. What can go wrong in expert 
collaborative practices with a first night in view is likely to go wrong, and on this 
basis many of our ensuing actions will constitute ways of coping. These ways 
of coping are characteristic, in my view, of a mastery in collaborative or 
collective performance-making whose implications are likely to be grasped at 
length, as I suggest above, rather than ‘in the moment’. 
 
Experience gained in collaborative or collective practice, from this perspective, 
‘transforms in the sense that it acquires form at the end of a crossing, of a trial 
of endurance, après coup’xxiv. For the ‘co-labouring’ practitioner, then, 
becoming other – a stage involved, I would argue, in acquiring mastery – ‘is to 
become self’. ‘One can only become [oneself, as an expert practitioner], 
through becoming other (en s’altérant), through alteration’. This fracturing of 
the self, that I am arguing is constitutive of the elaboration of (expert) identity in 
the collaborative practitioner, is not immediately absorbed but opens identity 
up, in both articulating and directing it, dividing it and splitting it. To return to the 
definitions of compromise, then, with which I began, compromise in expert 
collaborative or collective making practices can entail a settlement of 
differences by mutual adjustment or modification of opposing claims, principles, 
demands; an agreement by mutual concession; but also – as we see in the film 
of the making of Tartuffe – a potential endangering, especially of reputation; an 
exposure to danger or suspicion, when what the performer undertakes is 
viewed critically, in the instant, by all other members of the collective.   
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
i I quote here and in viii below from a number of online etymological dictionaries, including 
www.oed.com; www.etymonline.com/index.php; www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary;  
ii The title of David Williams’ Théâtre du Soleil Sourcebook, London & New York: Routledge, 1999. 
iii Brian Massumi writes explicitly about affect, in his Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, 
Sensation (2002), where he notes, in spinozan terms, that affect ‘is synesthetic, implying a 
participation of the senses in each other: the measure of a living thing’s potential interactions is 
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its ability to transform the effects of one sensory mode into those of another’ (p.35). See also M. 
Gregg and G. Seigworth’s The Affect Theory Reader, Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2010. 
The play of affect is complex and shifting; it is likely to be experienced, by the practitioner, as 
singular. 
iv Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, Durham & London: Duke 
University Press, 2002. 
v Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, trans. A. Sheridan, 1977, 
London: Vintage, 1998. 
vi Charles Spinosa, ‘Derridian dispersion and Heideggerian articulation: General tendencies in the 
practices that govern intelligibility’, in Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and Von Savigny (eds), The Practice 
Turn in Contemporary Theory, London; Routledge, 2001. 
vii See, indicatively, K. A Ericsson, N.Charness, P. J. Feltovich, R. Hoffman (eds), The Cambridge 
Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. On 
‘practice theory’, see T. Schatzki,  K. Knorr Cetina and E. Von Savigny (eds), The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory, London: Routledge, 2001. 
viii See note i, above. 
ix Michel de Certeau, in his “What we Do When we Believe”, in M. Blonsky (ed), On Signs, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, seems to me to approach such questions but to-
date few published writers in Performance Studies have done so. 
x The two collaborated on – amongst other pieces - Configurations, 1988 and 2012; Strange Blooms, 
2013. 
xi Ariane Mnouchkine, L’Age d’Or: the long journey from 1793 to 1975, Theatre Quarterly 5: 18, 
1975. 
xii Emile Copfermann, ‘Entretiens avec Ariane Mnouchkine’, Travail théâtral, 1976. 
xiii Film Au Soleil mȇme la nuit, AGAT Films & Cie, le Théâtre du Soleil, La Sept Arte,  
xiv S. Bryant Bertail, in her ‘Gender, Empire and Body Politic as Mise en Scène: Mnouchkine's "Les 
Atrides"’, Theatre Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 1-30 takes up this sort of issue. Relatively 
few English language texts approach the Mnouchkine phenomenon. Notable is A. Kiernander’s Ariane 
Mnouchkine and the Theatre du Soleil, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.  In contrast, 
French language publications and articles abound, and many are included on the website 
http://www.theatre-du-soleil.fr. 
xv © Agats Film & Cie, Théâtre du Soleil, La Sept ARTE – 1997. I have written 
elsewhere about this production and its peculiarities – see for example my “Constitutive Ambiguities”, 
in J. Kelleher & N. Rideout (eds), Contemporary Theatres in Europe, London and New York: 
Routledge 2006.A critical companion, 2006 
xvi A clip is available online at: http://www.theatre-du-soleil.fr/thsol/notre-librairie/le-tartuffe,300/le-
film-au-soleil-meme-la-nuit,800?lang=fr 
xvii I have written ‘what I take to be…’ because interpreting facial and vocal options, along with 
other bodywork options/actions, tends to entail recourse to what I have called ‘major models of 
intelligibility’.  These, in turn, relate to positioning, perspectives and points of view (eg 
practitioner perspectives and/versus spectator perspectives). Most of us use these interpretive 
models on a daily basis, to seem ‘to read’ others’ facial and other modes of expression, in terms – 
generally - of what cannot be seen but must be sensed or intuited on the base of what can be seen 
or heard.  What is at work here in semiotic terms is called symptomatics. 
xviii The term “technicity” comes initially from Foucault’s notion of what translators have called 
‘technologies of the self’ (‘technique de soi’), where the focus is quite particular to his enquiry into 
power (1992).  The notion of ‘technicity’ relates more specifically  to the ways technology 
operates in the human everyday (‘arts of existence’), and in this sense, I would also identify a 
technicity specific to ‘acting’ or to ‘dance ’in the European and English traditions. More 
particularly in the terms of this chapter, a technicity of the self supposes ways of being and doing 
that tend to be patterned, consistent, and to a certain extent culturally shared. That they are 
shared, rather than singular, seems to me to be apparent in the ways we can interpret and indeed 
critique our own and others’ ways of being and doing in the world.  
xix Symptomatically, because the self, in many senses an abstraction, cannot be directly 
represented; instead, a performer materially articulates what she or he (and onlookers, if the 
work is effective) take to be indices of self.  In this sense “self” is a model of intelligibility, that 
informs certain sorts of interpretation of material ‘signs’. Interpretation of symptoms applies 
equally to performer and onlooker; sometimes there is disagreement. 
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xx J-P Milet ‘Experience as Technique of the Self’ in Tekhnema 2 /Technics and Finitude/ Spring 1995, 
online at http://tekhnema.free.fr/2Milet.htm, consulted April 2013); see also M. Heidegger, "The 
Nature of Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. P.D. Hertz, Harper Collins, 1982. 
xxi Various models of intelligibility apply here, and are exercised whenever we attribute 
imagination, thought and emotion – mainstream ways of interpreting material actions - to either 
character or to performer self. 
xxii Milet ibid 
xxiii Milet ibid 
xxiv Milet ibid 
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